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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a criminal contempt case brought in connection with the criminal case State v. 
Lorimor. The district court affirmed Defendant's conviction. Defendant appeals. 
B. Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
1. Procedural History of the State v. Lorimor Case 
The Boise City Prosecutor's Office accused Mr. Lorimor of possession of an open 
container in public in violation of Boise City Code§ 6-01-15, and battery in violation of Idaho 
Code§§ 18-903, 904. Magistrate Judge Watkins presided over the case. R. 511. The 
Defendant in the instant case allegedly represented Mr. Lorimor in his defense against the 
charges. Robert Chastain represented Mr. Lorimor as co-counsel. R. 512. 
In the course of representing Mr. Lorimor, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress, a 
Motion to Dismiss, and a Motion in Limine. See, R. 518-23. On June 21, 2011, a hearing was 
held on these motions. R. 512. Magistrate Watkins denied all motions in a Memorandum 
Decision dated August 1, 2011. R. 518-23. Defendant then allegedly filed a Motion to 
Withdraw dated August 12, 2011, and on August 23, 2011, Magistrate Watkins held a hearing 
thereon. R. 512. He also denied this motion. State Ex.2. A jury trial was held on October 20, 
2011, in which Mr. Lorimor was acquitted of the battery charge, and the open container 
charge was dismissed. R. 513. 
2. Procedural History of the Contempt Charge 
The Written Charge was initiated on August 23, 2011. Its case number was obtained 
from the comt clerk prior to a hearing on the Motion to Withdraw for State v. Lorimor, tr. p. 
33 ll. 17-20, and served at the conclusion of the State v. Lorimor hearing. State Ex. 2, p. 15., 
11. 8-13. No initiating affidavit was provided in support of the Written Charge. Tr. p. 27 ll. 
' "Defendant" refers to Appellant; the defendant in the underlying case is referred to as "Lorimor" or "Mr. 
Lorimor"; "Written Findings'' refers to the trial court's Memorandum Decision and Order; "Written Charge" 
refers to the Written Charge of Contempt; Notice to Appear. All emphases to quotations are added. 
1 
14-17, p. 59 ll. 3-8. After serving the Written Charge, Magistrate Watkins informed Defendant 
that he would be presiding over the contempt proceedings, tr. p. 43 11. 13-14, but subsequently 
recused himself, along with five additional magistrates, pursuant to Canon 3-E of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct. R. 8. 
At trial, Magistrate Watkins testified that he brought the case pursuant to LC. § 7-601, 
tr. p. 25, 1. 1-15, but Defendant was convicted of "violating" the procedural rule I.R.C.P. 75. R. 
25., The court clerk filed the case under LC.§ 18-1801. R. 467. On intermediate appeal, 
Judge Sticklen upheld the conviction based on LC.§ 7-601-1. See, R. 482 n. 19. Magistrate 
Gardunia presided over the initial appearance, and did not take a plea from Defendant. R. 11, 
tr. pp. 3-6. Magistrate Gardunia stated that "I don't believe a prosecutor is going to be 
representing the state, Mr. Neal. This is a contempt hearing." Tr. p. 311. 10-14. The Ada 
County Prosecutor's Office was later appointed to prosecute the case by .Juvenile Magistrate 
Manweiler, the trial judge for the case at bar. R. 38. 
On the day of trial, October 7, 2011, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction or Motion for Directed Verdict, and a Second Motion for Directed 
Verdict. Tr. p. 70, 11. 14-25, p. 71, 11. 1-4. Following these motions, Magistrate Manweiler 
continued the trial to October 26, 2011, tr. p. 78, 11. 9-10, when he found Defendant guilty of 
I.R.C.P. 75. Tr. p. 97 l.19-20. 
A month after adjudicating Defendant guilty of contempt, and sentencing him, 
,Juvenile Magistrate Manweiler issued the Written Findings. R. 168-79. The Written Findings 
were required to contain "specific findings of fact." LR.C.P. 75(k). They contained a total of 
five (5) factual findings. R. 170. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on November 29, 
2011. R. 184. On intermediate appeal, eight months after the matter was submitted on the 
briefs, Judge Sticklen affirmed. R. 490. Defendant timely appealed. R. 494. 
2 
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3. Facts Giving Rise to the Contempt Charge 
Much of this case spawned from the open container charge against Lorimor. The 
relevant Boise City ordinance proscribed "consum[ing] any alcoholic beverage or ... 
possessi[ng] any open container of any alcoholic beverage in a public place within the City of 
Boise ... except as otherwise provided by law." R. 520. The ordinance therefore generally 
prohibited consuming alcohol in public and possessing an open container of alcohol in public. 
Boise City Police Officer Nixon found a closed empty flask on Lorimor's person and charged 
him with violating the ordinance. Defendant Ex. G. Therefore, Defendant filed a motion to 
dismiss the open container charge on the basis that the relevant container was closed, not 
open. See, R. 520, Defendant Ex. G. 
This issue was addressed at the June 21 hearing. Defendant Ex. G. At the hearing, 
Officer Nixon twice testified that his recorder contained the entire contact with Lorimor. 
Officer Nixon also testified that his recording would be the best record of his contact between 
him and Lorimor, and that the "time stamp" on the recorder would indicate the duration of 
his contact with Lorimor. Defendant Ex. G. When asked whether Lorimor had made any 
comments to him, Officer Nixon cautioned that he was "going off memory" and then 
referenced the fact that his recorder contained the answer to the question. Defendant Ex. G. 
After that qualification, he stated that he "believe[d]" that Lorimor admitted to drinking out of 
a flask while inside the Egyptian Theatre, but Magistrate Watkins acknowledged all along that 
the recorder did not contain the admission, state ex. 2, P. 8, 1. 25, P. 9, 11. 2-3, instead believing 
that the admission was "Not one that was recorded, but at a later time." State Ex. 2, P. 9, 11. 
17-19. However, at trial, Defendant's attorney replayed Officer Nixon's testimony for 
Magistrate Watkins, where it was repeatedly revealed that the recorder contained all contact 
between Officer Nixon and Lorimor. In response, Magistrate Watkins conceded under oath 
3 
that "it's clear from what was just played there that that admission was not 
made." Tr. p.5811. 16-22. 
After the hearing, on August 1, 2011, Magistrate Watkins issued a Memorandum 
Decision denying the motions. R. 518-23. The motion to dismiss the open container charge. 
was denied because of Lorimor's "admission" to drinking out of the flask, i.e., the "admission" 
that Magistrate Watkins conceded clearly had not been made. R. 520-21. The decision also 
contained a footnote suggesting that Defendant was not capable of practicing criminal law in 
Ada County. R. 520 n.2. According to Magistrate Watkins, he insulted Defendant because his 
motions were too "pompous" for "someone who's having his first case in front of me" tr. p. 34, 
11. 13-25, and therefore Magistrate Watkins "thought it was appropriate to lob a shell across 
[Defendant's] bow as it were to kind of wake [him] up." State Ex. 2, p. 11, 11. 11-12. The insult 
"was a bit out of character for me." Tr. p. 36, 1. 3. 
After Magistrate Watkins insulted Defendant, Defendant allegedly filed a Motion to 
Withdraw from the case. The basis for the Motion to Withdraw was stated as follows: "Due to 
Counsel's inability to maintain the requisite level of respect for this Court, Counsel feels that it 
would be in his client's best interests to withdraw from this matter." State Ex. 1, p. 7. The 
Motion to Withdraw described several areas of disagreement with Magistrate Watkins, 
particularly Magistrate Watkins' statement of the test for custody in Miranda cases. 2 State Ex. 
1, p. 2-3. It stated that, due to Defendant's perception that Magistrate Watkins had erred in 
multiple respects, Defendant had formed a belief that resulted in the inability to maintain the 
requisite level of respect for Magistrate Watkins. State Ex. 1, p. 7. The belief, based on 
Defendant's perception of the magistrate's errors, was that the magistrate was either lazy, 
' Magistrate Watkins stated that "The test is a subjective one and the only relevant inquiry is how a 
reasonable man in the suspect's position wou Id have understood his situation." State Ex. 2, p. 2, R. 521. 
4 
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incompetent, biased, or prejudiced. State Ex. 1, pp. 6-7. 
By way of illustration, the Motion to Withdraw expressed incredulity with regard to 
the factual finding that Lorimor admitted to drinking alcohol out of a flask. State Ex. 1, p. 7. 
Because .Defendant's wife had just given birth to a baby, D~fendant was absent from the 
hearing and later inquired of Robert Chastain regarding this finding. Defendant Ex. G. 
According to Mr. Chastain's sworn testimony, Defendant "Absolutely" believed that no 
evidence was presented at the hearing sufficient to establish that Mr. Lorimor admitted to 
drinking, and Defendant's "absolute" belief was based on his conversation with Mr. Chastain. 
Tr. p. 73, l. 24-25; p. 74, l. 1, l. 7-11. The state conducted no cross-examination of Mr. 
Chastain. Tr. p 74, 11. 21-22 . 
The Motion to Withdraw concluded that, because that fact did not exist, it was made 
up. It was sure to clarify that the "making up" of the fact was not necessarily intentional, 
because it may have been "made up" as a result of mere incompetence or laziness, or may 
have been a product of biases or prejudices. State Ex. 1, pp. 6-7. If the fact was "made up" as 
a result of incompetence, of course, it was not made up with the intent to find a nonexistent 
fact; it was simply a mistake. The motion also did not assert that any one of these possibilities 
was necessarily true, and it did not assert that Magistrate Watkins was consciously aware of 
any potential bias or prejudice. State Ex. 1. Biases and prejudices, of course, can be 
subconscious. 
Nevertheless, Magistrate Watkins charged Defendant with criminal contempt, and 
alleged that the motion made much different statements from what was actually contained in 
the motion.3 
that this court was too lazy to listen to an exhibit before making its ruling; that the court 
was too incompetent to reach the correct legal conclusion; that the court made up facts to 
support its ruling; that this court made up this fact fill !h.iu. its former employer would 
5 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the lower courts acquired jurisdiction without an initiating affidavit; 
B. Whether the Written Charge is jurisdictionally defective or denied Defendant notice; 
C. Whether the First Amendment precludes punishment for the speech at issue; 
D. Whether it was error to affirm on a different legal basis than the conviction's basis; 
E. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction under LC.§ 7-601-1.; 
F. Whether Defendant should be awarded attorney fees on appeal and/or below. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. No Affidavit was Supplied; the Court never Acquired Subject-Matter 
Jurisdiction 
1. Failure to Supply an Affidavit is Fatal to a Contempt Charge 
The charging document "alleging an offense was committed within the State of Idaho 
confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the court." State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410,420 
(2012). With regard to indirect criminal contempt proceedings, "until a sufficient affidavit [is 
provided], the court does not have jurisdiction to proceed." Steiner v. Gilbert, 144 Idaho 240, 
243 (2007). "[W]hen the contempt is not committed in the immediate view and 
presence of the court, or judge, no jurisdiction is acquired by the court until the 
affidavit required by the statute4 is presented." Harkness v. Hyde, 31 Idaho 784, 176 P. 
885, 886 (1918). "[J]udgments and orders made without subject matter jurisdiction are 
void[.]" State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 840 (2011). 
In Lute, the Court vacated the defendant's conviction because the charge was not 
initiated according to the procedural requirements of the Idaho Criminal Rules. Specifically, 
the "indictment" was presented by an expired "grand jury" under I.C.R. 6.8. This rule was 
"clear and unambiguous" that a grand jury expires after six months, State v. Dailing, 128 
Idaho 203, 206 (1996), and thus no indictment existed to confer subject matter jurisdiction. 
The Lute analysis directly applies to this case. The grand jury process is the 
mechanism for initiating felony charges with an indictment, I.C.R. 6.1(c)(10); an affidavit is 
benefit, .!!!ill[] that the court was prejudiced against Mr. Scott. 
R. 6-7. 
1 The affidavit is now required by court rule. I.C.R 42, LR.C.P. 75. 
6 
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the mechanism for initiating contempt proceedings with a written charge. If the grand jury is 
expired, "there was no defect in the grand jury process; rather there was no grand jury process 
at all [and] a valid indictment was never entered[.]" Lute, 150 Idaho at 841. If a valid 
indictment was not entered, the "court never had subject matter jurisdiction." Id. 
Similarly, if no affidavit was presented in support of a contempt charge, then "there 
was no [affidavit] at all and a valid [ written charge] was never entered." Both !.C.R. 42(c) 
and I.R.C.P. 75(c) are "clear and unambiguous" that "Nonsummary contempt proceedings 
may be commenced only as provided herein." As such, when those rules require an affidavit, 
the court never acquires subject matter jurisdiction without one. As explained below, !.C.R. 
42 was the applicable rule. But regardless, both rules required an affidavit, and because none 
was supplied, the conviction is void. 
2. No Exception to the Affidavit Requirement Applies 
a. I.R.C.P. 75, if Applicable, Would Have Required an Affidavit 
I.R.C.P. 75(c), when applicable, exclusively and exhaustively governs the 
commencement of nonsummary proceedings, providing: "Nonsummary contempt 
proceedings may be commenced only as provided herein." I.R.C.P. 75(c)(1) specifically 
"provides" that, when a judge initiates contempt proceedings, "The written charge must be 
supported by an affidavit unless [1] the facts recited in it are based upon the judge's personal 
knowledge and/or [2] upon information from the court file contained in documents prepared 
by court personnel." The first "fact recited in the Written Charge" was "That ... Mr. Scott 
fUed a Motion[.]" This factual allegation is necessary in order to prove the alleged 
contempt: if Defendant had not filed the motion, it would be indisputable that no contempt 
occurred.5 Neither affidavit exception applies to that allegation. Thus, an affidavit was 
5 ,Juvenile Magistrate Manweiler clearly agreed that the filing of the motion was necessary in order to 
justify a contempt sanction, because the first of his five factual findings was that "Scott authored and filled 
(sic) the Motion to Withdraw on August 12, 2011." R. 170. 
7 
required. 
i. Judge Sticklen Erred when she Distinguished between the 
Personal Knowledge Requirement for Summary Proceedings 
and Personal Knowledge for the I.R.C.P. 75(c)(1) Affidavit 
Exception 
. Judge Sticklen erred when she asserted that "Scott is mixing the requisite personal 
knowledge required for a summary contempt proceeding with the personal knowledge 
required in a non-summary proceeding [under I.R.C.P. 75(c)(1)]." R. 476. The distinction 
suggested by Judge Sticklen does not exist. In I.R.C.P. 75, the two exceptions to the affidavit 
requirement-personal knowledge and court-prepared documents-reflect two contempt 
principles developed by the U.S. and Idaho Supreme Courts respectively. The first exception 
applies to direct contempt; the second applies to hybrid contempt. 
"Hybrid contempt," created by the Idaho Supreme Court, occurs when an attorney 
fails to appear in court at the time scheduled. Matter of Williams, 120 Idaho 473,478 (1991) 
("the contempt [failing to appear in court] is a hybrid, but is ultimately a direct contempt 
committed in the presence of the court."); see also, Butler v. Goff, 130 Idaho 905, 908 (1997) 
(direct contempts are treated summarily; thus, no affidavit was requiredfor the 
court to initiate contempt proceedings). Hybrid contempt comes into play when an 
attorney has received notice of a scheduled hearing, and then fails to appear. The language in 
I.R.C.P. 75(c)(1) reflects this factual scenario, by removing the affidavit requirement when 
the contempt is based on a "document prepared by court personnel," such as a Notice of 
Hearing or Scheduling Order.6 See also, I.C.R. 42(c)(1). 
On the other hand, a "direct contempt [is] contempt that occurs in the immediate 
6 This affidavit exception clearly does not apply here; neither the state nor the lower courts deemed it 
applicable. The Written Charge stated that the contempt was "hybrid," and that it was "based on the 
court's personal knowledge and upon information contained in the court file." R 7. The information in the 
court file, however, must have been contained in a document prepared lll:, m.t personne). Magistrate 
Watkins admitted that the motion to withdraw was the only relied-upon information in the court file. Tr. p. 
59, 11. 9-13. Obviously that document was not prepared by court personnel. 
8 
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presence of the court where the judge has personal knowledge of allfacts necessary to 
constihtte the contempt based upon thejudge's own observation of the 
contemphtous conduct." Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850,866 n. 11 
(2002). "Summary contempt proceedings can be used only in instances of direct contempt[.]" 
Id. 
I.R.C.P. 75(c)(1) incorporates the direct contempt principle. It removes the affidavit 
requirement only when the judge has personal knowledge of the facts recited in the written 
charge. Under I.R.C.P. 75(c)(3), the "facts recited in the written charge" are "the specific 
facts constituting the alleged contempt." "Personal knowledge" is defined as "knowledge 
qained through firsthand observation or experience, as distinguished from belief based on 
what someone else has said." Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed. 2000). 
Therefore, I.R.C.P. 75(c)(1) removes the affidavit requirement only when the judge 
has "knowledge gained through.firsthand observation7 of the specificfacts 
constihtting the alleged contempt.8" That is effectively the definition of direct contempt. 
The personal knowledge requirement of I.R.C.P. 75(c)(1) clearly restates the same precise 
concept of direct contempt necessary to conduct summary proceedings. The direct contempt 
concept simply applies to two different cases: summary proceedings and I.R.C.P. 75(c)(1). 
In I.R.C.P. 75(c)(1) cases, a court observes a direct contempt, but does not respond 
summarily. In such cases, the court must conduct nonsummary proceedings under I.R.C.P. 
75(c). Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 US 821, 832-33 (1994)("If a court delays punishing a 
direct contempt until the completion of trial, ... due process requires that the contemnor's 
rights to notice and a hearing be respected.") As Goff explained, the affidavit requirement is 
7 i.e., personal knowledge. 
k i.e., the facts recited in the written charge. 
9 
removed in cases of direct contempt because a judge could have acted summarily. If the 
judge could have acted summarily, based on his personal knowledge of all necessary facts, 
then obviating the affidavit requirement is warranted when the proceedings are delayed and 
nonsummary proceedings are conducted. I.R.C.P. 75(c)(1) clearly applies the same direct 
contempt concept applicable to summary proceedings. 
ii. Knowledge of Admissions to Conduct does not Suffice 
As explained above, "personal knowledge" is defined as "knowledge gained through 
firsthand observation or experience, as distinguishedfrom belief based on what 
someone else has said."9 It follows from this definition that knowledge of an admission to 
conduct does not constitute personal know ledge of the conduct itself, as a belief based on an 
admission is a belief "based on what someone else has said." For example, Defendant could 
"admit" that Jimmy Hoffa was buried in his backyard, or that he shot J.F.K. from the grassy 
knoll, but those admissions would not impart personal knowledge to the effect that he 
possessed Hoffa's remains or assassinated the President. 
The key case illustrating this point is Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925). 
Cooke involved a lawyer's letter submitted to a judge, a letter that the Court assumed 
constituted contempt.10 The Cooke Court quoted Savin, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 267, 277 (1889) 
for the proposition that ''in cases [in] which the judge cannot have such personal knowledge, 
and is informed thereof only by the confes:,-ion of the party ... , the proper practice 
is" to conduct nonsum mary proceedings. Id. at 535. In other words, Cooke held that the 
judge could not have had personal knowledge of all of the facts constituting the attorney's 
'' Similarly, under Rule 602 of the Federal Rules of Evidence "'personal knowledge' really means 
firsthand knowledge ... through [one's 1 own senses[. A] witness may [not] testify to an event . .. 
that he knows only from the description of others." DataMill, Inc. v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 722 
(2010) (quoting 3 C.B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Fedel'alEvidence § 6:5 (3d ed.2007)). 
1° Cooke did not involve a First Amendment challenge, and predated the Court's First Amendment contempt 
jurisprudence. As explained below, the First Amendment precludes punishment for the speech here at 
issue. 
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alleged contempt, and therefore the contempt was not direct contempt. Because it was not 
direct contempt, summary proceedings were inappropriate. 
The crucial point is that U.S. Supreme Court precedent holds that a document 
submitted to a judge is not direct contempt, even if the attorney "confesses" to authoring it. 
The affidavit requirement is removed only in cases of direct (or hybrid) contempt, i.e., in cases 
in which the judge possesses personal knowledge of all of the facts constituting the contempt. 
The U.S. Supreme Court is clear, in this exact context, that personal knowledge cannot be 
acquired by a "confession" to authoring a pleading. 
iii. There was no Personal Knowledge Defendant Filed the 
Motion 
Magistrate Watkins testified that he lacked the requisite personal knowledge, because 
he admitted that he "had no personal contact with Mr. Scott prior to the motion to withdraw," 
tr. p. 34, 11. 3-7, and that the conduct "did not occur in my presence." Tr. p. 25, 11. 8-10 At 
trial, Magistrate Watkins was directly asked whether he possessed personal knowledge that 
Defendant filed the motion. Tr. p. 3:3, 11. 1-3. He testified that his "personal knowledge" was 
",Ju.stfrom my discussion with him at the [motion to withdraw] hearing." Tr. p. 
33, 1. 4-5. At the motion to withdraw hearing, he stated that "I think this may be the first 
time I've ever laid eyes on [Defendant]." State Ex. 2, p. 10, 11. 22-23. Thus, he couldn't 
possess personal knowledge of the authoring/filing of the motion. 
The state argued that he "had personal knowledge of everything" due to admissions. 
Tr. p. 96, 11. 14-16. The trial court reasoned that Magistrate Watkins possessed the requisite 
personal knowledge because "Scott ... admitted ... that he authored the Motion to 
Withdraw." R. 177. In going a step further, Judge Sticklen found personal knowledge existed 
because "[t]here was no question" Defendant filed it, "and he did not deny having 
done so during the hearing[.]" R. 477. 
11 
The admissions (or failure to deny) may be relevant after the initiation of the 
proceedings, but until the proceedings were properly initiated, there was no jurisdiction to 
proceed. That was the lesson taught by Lute, where Mr. Lute plead guilty to the crime 
charged. 150 Idaho at 841. Thus, "there was no question" that Mr. Lute was guilty, but that 
fact was irrelevant because the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to determine guilt. 
Lute teaches that the determination of guilt follows the proper initiation of the proceedings, 
and that the merit of the substantive allegations cannot validate, post hoc, proceedings 
improperly initiated.11 Until the proceedings are properly initiated, the court lacks 
subject-matter jurisdiction to determine guilt in the first place. Because Magistrate Watkins' 
"personal knowledge" was actually based on admissions by Defendant, and not personal 
knowledge, an affidavit was required. It was not supplied. The conviction is void. 
b. Idaho Criminal Rule 42 Required an Affidavit in this Case 
I.C.R. 42 applies to "all contempt proceedings brought in connection with a criminal 
proceeding." I.R.C.P. 75 applies to ''all contempt proceedings brought in connection with a 
civil lawsuit or as a separate proceeding." The evidence establishes that the charge was 
"brought in connection with" a criminal proceeding: 
• Magistrate Watkins served Defendant with a document titled "State Vs. Lorimor." 
Defendant Ex. C, Tr. p. 25, 11. 16-25, p. 26, 11. 1-9. 
• Magistrate Watkins believed that the contempt charge was brought in connection with 
State v. Lorimor. Tr. p. 30, 11. 16-17. 
• Magistrate Watkins attempted to use the same case number as State v. Lorimor. Tr. p. 
30, 11. 1-15. 
• The Written Charge was served at the August 23 hearing for State v. Lorimor, and 
Nlagistrate Watkins arranged for the marshal to be present at that hearing to serve it. 
Tr. p. 37, 11. 8-11. 
• The alleged conduct of filing the motion occurred in connection with State v. Lorimor. 
Tr. p. 30, 11. 16-18. 
• State v. Lorimor is a criminal case. Tr. p. 30, ll. 19-21. 
11 The Lute Court therefore rejected the lower court's reasoning that Lute's ''guilty plea rendered the 
procedural defects in the grand jury indictment harmless, and no jurisdictional defect existed." 150 Idaho 
at 839. 
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Some authority seems to suggest that a proceeding is "separate" if it is a criminal 
contempt (as is the case here). See, e.g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 US 384,396 
(1990) ("A criminal contempt charge is likewise a separate and independent proceeding at law 
that is not part of the original action.") (internal quotations removed). However, that 
language cannot be squared with !.C.R. 42, which makes several provisions for criminal 
contempts. E.g., I.C.R. 42(g)(1), 42(g)(2), 42(i)(1), 42(i)(2), 42(j)(2). In fact, !.C.R. 
42(c)(1) specifically addresses contempts consisting of a failure to appear in court, which is 
always a criminal contempt. See, 42(a)(7). If all criminal contempts were "separate," I.C.R. 
42 would never apply to criminal contempts. Since I.C.R. 42 clearly does apply to criminal 
contempts, it cannot be true that criminal contempts, by themselves, trigger the "separate 
proceeding" language in I.R.C.P. 75. In other words, a contempt proceeding is not "separate" 
under I .R.C.P. 75 just because it is a "separate and independent proceeding ... not part of the 
original action." That description fits all criminal contempts and would eliminate I .C.R. 42's 
applicability to any criminal contempt. 
Instead, an I.R.C.P. 75 "separate proceeding" is a proceeding that is not connected to a 
civil or criminal case. The two rules exhaust all possible scenarios: all contempts in 
connection with a civil (I.R.C.P. 75) or criminal (I.C.R. 42) proceeding, and also those 
contempts that are not in connection with (i.e., are separate from) either civil or criminal 
proceedings (I.R.C.P. 75). For example, a contempt arising out of a spectator's loud and 
boisterous courtroom conduct would be unconnected to either a civil or criminal case and 
would be properly prosecuted under I.R.C.P. 75. 
The case at bar is not a case in which the relevant conduct was separate from a 
criminal matter. To the contrary, the contempt case arose directly out of a motion allegedly 
filed in the criminal case. Therefore !.C.R. 42 applies. I.C.R. 42(c) mandates that 
13 
"Nonsummary contempt proceedings may be commenced only as provided herein" and 
!.C.R. 42(c)(2) requires an initiating affidavit for "All contempt proceedings" except for hybrid 
contempt. Without the initiating affidavit, the proceeding was not commenced "as provided" 
and thus all subsequent proceedings are void. In re Koehler, 181 Cal.App-4th 1153, 1169 
(2010) ("In short, indirect contempt requires there be an initiating affidavit, and without one 
any contempt order is void.") 
B. The Written Charge was Jurisdictionally Defective and Denied Defendant Due 
Process 
A Contempt Respondent "is entitled to notice of the exact charges against him." Ross v. 
Coleman, 114 Idaho 817, 838 (1988). Both !.C.R. 42(c)(2) and I.R.C.P. 75(c)(3) require that 
a written charge or initiating affidavit include "the specific facts constituting the alleged 
contempt." "Where the affidavit fails to allege all essential material facts, however, such 
deficiencies cannot be cured by proof supplied at the hearing, or by judicial notice of the 
court's own records." First Security Bank of Idaho, NA. v. Hansen, 107 Idaho 472,481 
(1984) (contempt reversed due to "no allegation ... that the ... Order [was] served on the 
defendants."). Moreover, "no intendments or presumptions may be indulged in to aid the 
sufficiency of the affidavit." Bandelin v. Quinlan, 94 Idaho 858, 860 (1972). "If an affidavit 
is presented which fails to recite on its face the substantive facts which constitute, or might 
constitute, a contempt on the part of the accused, the court is withoutjurisdiction." Id. at 
861. "The facts allegedly constituting the contempt must be recited with particularity." Id. 
An affidavit cannot merely state conclusions of law. Id. 
First, the Written Charge did not allege that the conduct occurred in Idaho. R. 6-7. 
This requirement is fundamental to any criminal charge, i.e., it is an "essential, material fact" 
that must be alleged. See, e.g., State v. Mowrey, 91 Idaho 693, 695 (1967). Thus, the 
conviction is void. Second, the Written Charge alleged no mens 1·ecz. R. 6-7. The only 
14 
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exception to the mens rea pleading requirement is described in I.R.C.P. 75(c)(3) and I.C.R. 
42(c)(2). The exception is limited to allegations of willful violations of orders. By implication, 
then, in all other cases the mens rea element must be alleged. It was not. Yet, mens rea is an 
"essential, material element" of a criminal offense.12 State v. Morales, 127 Idaho 951,953 (Ct. 
App. 1996). The contempt sanction is void. Third, the Written Charge alleged that "these 
statements ... are libelous." R. 6-7. Libel is a legal term, and thus the allegation is a mere 
legal conclusion, not plead with particularity. The contempt sanction is void. Fourth, the 
Written Charge failed to allege, pursuant to I.C. § 7-601-1., conduct that occurred while the 
magistrate was "holding the court" or that "tended to interrupt the due course of the trial or 
other judicial proceedings." R. 6-7. The conviction is void. 
C. The First Amendment Precludes Punishment for the Speech Here at Issue 
1. "Hard Facts Make Bad Law" 
In free speech cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has been faced with many "hard facts," 
but consistently avoided the temptation to pervert the law in order to reach a "good" result. 
Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that, in America, the First Amendment allows its 
citizens to burn the American flag as a political protest, 13 to lie about receiving a Purple Heart 
or the Congressional Medal of Honor, 14 and to picket an American soldier's funeral with signs 
reading "Thank God for Dead Soldiers" and "God Hates Fags."15 As Justice Kennedy aptly 
stated in his concurrence in Johnson (the flag burning case), "The hard fact is that sometimes 
we must make decisions we do not like. We make them because they are right, right in the 
sense that the law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the result." 491 U.S. at 
420-21. 
'" For example, if Defendant did not willfully file the motion, with knowledge of its contents, he was not 
guilty. 
,:i Texas u. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,399 (1989). 
14 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537, _ (2012). 
'
0 Snyderu. Phelps, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011). 
15 
2. Standard of Review16 of First Anlendment Cases 
Craig v. Harney, an indirect criminal contempt case, held that, "In a case where it is 
asserted that a person has been deprived by a State court of a fundamental right secured by 
the Constitution, an independent examination ofthefacts by this Court is often required 
to be made. This is such a case." 331 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1947) (internal citations omitted); see 
also, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964) (accord as to defamation). Idaho 
also is in accord. Wiemer v. Rankin, 117 Idaho 566, 575 (1990) ("the question whether the 
evidence in the record in a defamation case is sufficient to support a finding of actual malice is 
a question oflaw.") (internal quotations, alteration omitted). Appellate courts exercise free 
review over questions oflaw. Mickelsen v. Broadway Ford, Inc., 153 Idaho 149, _ (2012). 
3. The Basis for the Charge is Invalid; Speech Limitations do not Apply 
At the outset, it should be noted that the proscription of "disorderly, contemptuous or 
insolent behavior toward a judge ... " is content-based and therefore "presumptively invalid." 
RA Vv. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("The First Amendment generally prevents 
government from proscribing ... expressive conduct because of disapproval of the ideas 
expressed. Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.") The "content" involves 
statements or expressive conduct regarding judges, and the regulation is clearly directed at 
this expression: 
"Contemptuous": manifesting,feeling, or expressing deep hatred or disapproval. 
"Insolent": insultingly contemptuous in speech or conduct. 
www.merriam-webster.com.17 
The proscription is actually specifically viewpoint based, because it is directed at those 
10 ,Judge Sticklen applied the "substantial competent evidence" standard. On an appeal from the district 
court acting in its appellate capacity on intermediate appeal, this Court directly reviews the district court. 
Losserv. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670,672 (2008). 
'7 "Disorderly" is defined as "engaged in conduct offensive to public order." This is a content-neutral term, 
and the proscription could be Constitutionally narrowed to this disjunct, but there was no evidence at trial 
to satisfy this definition. In fact, as expla.ined below, the only presented evidence eliminates this disjunct's 
applicability. 
16 
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who hold a negative viewpoint regarding judges. Viewpoint-based restrictions are never 
tolerated. "It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its 
substantive content or the message it conveys. [G]overnment regulation may not favor one 
speaker over another." Rosenberger v. Rector and Visit.ors of Univ. of Va., 515 US 819, 
828-29 (1995). When "the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken 
by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant." Id. 
"[O]nly a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's 
constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms." NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415,438 (1963). On this point, the U.S. Supreme Court has identified a 
limited number of "well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and 
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem." United 
States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, _ (2010) (quotations omitted) (listing categories18). 
Thus, depending on the circumstances, attorney speech may be extremely 
circumscribed. See, Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991) ("in the 
courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding, [an attorney's] 'free speech' is extremely 
circumscribed.") In other cases, it is not circumscribed at all. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 
64, 66 (1964) (full protection for lawyer who accused judges, during pending criminal cases, 
of "laziness," "inefficiency," and potential "racketeer influences on our eight 
vacation-minded judges.") 
The key to determining whether an attorney's speech is fully protected, as in Garrison, 
or barely protected, as suggested in Gentile, is to determine the interests to be served by the 
proscription. Defamation of public officials concerns reputation, and is protected speech 
1
~ One such category is "defamation," but when public officials are involved, that category is limited to the 
extremely rare cases involving "actual malice." See, infra. 
17 
absent proof of "actual malice"; ethical rules serve the interest in regulating a specialized 
profession, and allow for a balancing analysis that is broader than in criminal cases; order in 
the courtroom justifies in-court speech limitations; contempt protects against threats to the 
administration of justice. Because the proscription is content-based, "the Government bears 
the burden to rebut that presumption [of invalidity.]" Stevens, 559 U.S. at_. Regardless, as 
explained below, the proscription is clearly unconstitutional as applied to Defendant, because 
it is explicitly directed at Defendant's message, rather than a Constitutionally proscribable evil; 
it is based on the Constitutionally illegitimate rationales of Seditious Libel and "reputation"; 
and the facts do not support the First Amendment elements applicable here, to wit, actual 
malice and an imminent threat to the administration of justice. The inadequate 
"justifications" for limiting Defendant's speech are discussed below. 
a. Ethical Precepts. In cases involving a state bar's regulation of attorney 
speech, the Supreme Court "engaged in a balancing process, weighing the State's interest in 
the regulation of a specialized profession against a lawyer's First Amendment interest in the 
kind of speech that was at issue." Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075. The Gentile Court cited a 
concurrence in In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959) that stated "[o]bedience to ethical precepts 
may require abstention from what in other circumstances might be ... protected speech." Id. 
at 1071. 
The Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho State Bar punish, through disciplinary 
proceedings, speech that violates relevant ethical precepts. See, I.B.C.R. 5oo(a) ("The 
Supreme Court has the inherent power and the exclusive responsibility within the 
State to maintain appropriate standards of Professional Conduct and to structure and 
administer a system to review the Professional Conduct of each Lawyer in the State."); 
I.R.P.C. 8.2(a); Idaho State Bar v. Topp, 129 Idaho 414,417 (1996) (interpreting I.R.P.C. 
18 
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8.2(a) not to require proof of "actual malice"). Magistrates are not members of the Idaho 
Supreme Court; therefore, it is not their role to "structure and administer a system to" 
regulate the profession. 
And it is in the discipline context that the free speech rules have been relaxed pursuant 
to our Supreme Court's exclusive role in regulating our specialized profession. But when the 
case involves criminal sanctions, the U.S. Supreme Court does not relax First Amendment 
standards in cases involving attorneys. Garrison involved a criminal case against an attorney 
for comments highly critical of eight judges during pending criminal cases. As a criminal 
case, Garrison did not involve ethical rules. Instead, the issue was whether "the New York 
Times rule [actual malice] also limits state power to impose criminal sanctionsfor 
criticism of the official conduct of public officials .... We hold that it does." 379 U.S. 
at 67. 
The attorney's speech in Garrison enjoyed the full First Amendment protection of the 
New York Times rule that only false statements made with "actual malice" "may be the 
subject of either civil or criminal sanctions." Id. at 74-75. If the attorney's speech is criticism 
of a judge, and the sanction is civil or criminal, the Supreme Court is clear that an attorney 
suffers no diminished First Amendment protection of his criticisms. Discipline cases, 
therefore, must possess a unique quality to avoid the Garrison standard. 
Idaho recognizes the unique character of discipline cases by acknowledging that they 
are sui generis and therefore are not "civil or criminal." I.B.C.R. 525(a) ("Disciplinary 
proceedings are neither civil nor criminal but are sui generis.") Discipline cases therefore are 
of narrow applicability. Again, the Gentile Court recognized that attorney speech may be 
protected in "other circumstances" than disciplinary proceedings. Thus, in discipline cases, the 
Idaho State Bar can escape the Garrison standard. See, Topp, supra. For although Garrison 
19 
effectively forbids criminal or civil punishment of attorneys who criticize judges, discipline 
cases are neither civil nor criminal. 
Criminal contempt, however, cannot be described as "neither civil nor criminal." State 
v. Doe, 149 Idaho 353,360 (2010) ("Convictions for criminal contempt are 
indistinguishable from ordinary criminal convictions, for their impact on the 
individual defendant is the same.") (quotations, alterations omitted); United States v. Dixon, 
509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993) ("constitutional protections for criminal defendants other than the 
double jeopardy provision apply in nonsummary criminal contempt prosecutions just as they 
do in other criminal prosecutions. We think it obvious, and today hold, that the protection of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause likewise attaches.") (citations omitted); Camp, 137 Idaho at 861. 
Because criminal contempt is a "criminal sanction," it necessarily follows from Garrison's 
explicit command that contempt may be punished only for statements made with actual 
malice. It also follows that discipline cases are inapplicable to criminal cases insofar as the 
cases impose greater restrictions on speech. Otherwise, Topp could not be squared with 
Garrison. 19 
This distinction was recognized in similar state court cases. Smith v. Pace, 313 S.W.3d 
124 (2010) (en bane); Wasserman v. State, 671 So.2d 846 (1996). Smith involved an 
attorney's pleading that alleged a potential conspiracy between the prosecutors and a judge. 
The Missouri court emphasized that the "disciplinary process may be a more suitable forum 
than a contempt proceeding," id. at 135, and stated that its decision "has no bearing on any 
disciplinary measures that may result from the attorney's conduct," id. at 126, before holding 
that "the lawyer's statements and attendant conduct actually must have interfered with or 
posed an imminent threat of interfering with the administration of justice." Id. at 137. It 
''' If discipline and criminal cases are indistinguishable, Topp must be overruled as inconsistent with Garrison. 
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therefore rejected the applicability of discipline cases, and instead applied the "imminent threat 
to the administration of justice" standard (discussed infra) to contempt cases. 
Florida's District Court of Appeal addressed an attorney's verbal abuse of a court's 
clerk, in which he called the clerk "a little motherfucker" and referred to the judge as "a 
motherfucking son of a bitch." Wasserman, 671 So.2d at 848. The court carefully 
distinguished between attorney discipline and criminal contempt, emphasizing that it "fully 
agree[d] with the Florida Supreme Court's conclusion that the right to free speech ... does not 
protect Mr. Wasserman from his much deserved disciplinary suspension[.]" Id. at 849. The 
court reversed because it was "not dealing with the area of disciplinary proceedings but 
instead with the narrow issue of criminal contempt," and was "bound by the restraints 
imposed by the First Amendment on ... criminal contempt." Id. 
b. Fair Trials/Participants/Reputation. In Gentile, the Court placed 
heavy emphasis on the fact that attorneys are participants in the litigation and thus may be 
subjected to speech restrictions under ethical rules. 501 U.S. at 1072. The Court cited 
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), another discipline case, for the proposition that 
"Collaboration between counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a 
criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of 
disciplinary measures." Id. The Court also held that "attorneys have a fiduciary responsibility 
not to engage in public debate that will redound to the detriment of the accused or that will 
obstruct the fair administration ofhtstice." Id. at 1074. "Because lawyers have special access 
to information through discovery and client communications, their extrajudicial statements 
pose a threat to the fairness of a pending proceeding since lawyers' statements are likely to be 
received as especially authoritative." Id. "Few, if any, interests ... are more fundamental 
than the right to a fair trial[.]" Id. at 1075. 
21 
The relevance of one's status as a participant, then, is the danger that the participant 
could affect the proceedings. This case, however, was not brought out of concern for the 
fairness of trials or because of an obstruction to the administration of justice. Indeed, 
Magistrate Watkins testified that his rulings would not be affected, tr. p. 29, 11. 21-25 and that 
he could be impartial toward Defendant. Tr. p. 37, 11. 12-20. He also testified that, other than 
the contempt proceeding itself, there was no interruption of the proceedings. Tr. p. 28, 11. 
20-25, p. 29, 11. 1-20. The case manifestly is not about concern for the proceedings because 
Magistrate Watkins did not believe the proceedings were affected. 
Instead, the allegations in the Written Charge, Magistrate Watkins' testimony, and the 
trial court's factual findings are all clear that the relevant "concern" was protecting the 
magistrate's reputation. The Written Charge alleged that the statements "are libelous and 
serve no purpose other than to degrade the court and bring it into the contempt of the people," 
R. 7, which clearly alleges that there was an effect on the court's reputation. The Written 
Charge lacked any allegation of harm to the judicial process. 
Magistrate Watkins testified that the motion was "contemptuous," because the 
criticism was unfair and "it impugned my character and my legal abilities." Tr. p. 15, 11. 
24-25; p. 16, 11. 1-2. He lamented that the criticism "besmirches my character," tr. p. 20, l. 19, 
because "a judge's reputation is probably the most important calling card" that he 
has "and anytime that is impugned ... it has a very detrimental effect on ... the judge." Tr. 
p. 20, 11. 3-7. The state's arguments were entirely focused on the effect on the judge or 
judiciary. E.g., R. 138. No evidence was presented to establish harm to the proceedings. 
Instead, the evidence focused exclusively on reputation. 
The trial comt's findings also revealed that reputation was the basis for the charge, 
"finding" that Defendant's "comments and assertions ... were ... disruptive ... by 
22 
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impunning (sic) the character and legal abilities of Judge Watkins[.]" R. 170. The 
trial court was unequivocal: "I think [Defendant's actions] tarnished and ridiculed the judge 
who otherwise has enjoyed an incredibly outstanding reputation as a jurist with intellect and 
passion, and a great sense of fairness and courtesy and civility."20 Tr. p. 114, 1. 13-16. 
Therefore, it is quite clear that the charge arose not out of concern for the Lorimor 
proceedings, but out of concern for the reputation of the court. However, "concernfor the . 
. . reputation of the courts does not justify the punishment as criminal contempt 
of criticism ofthejudge or his decision." Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272-73 (citing Bridgesv. 
California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941)). In Garrison, the Court dealt with a non-discipline criminal 
case in which the attorney was a participant in the proceedings. The relevant concern was the 
judge's reputation, and the attorney's speech was no less protected just because he was an 
attorney. The Garrison facts are the essential facts of this case. They mandate full First 
Amendment protection for Defendant.21 
c. Criminal Contempt Cases. Juvenile Magistrate Manweiler distinguished 
the controlling U.S. Supreme Court cases because those cases "are criminal contempt cases[.]" 
R. 173. He apparently believed this was not a criminal contempt case, because he 
"distinguished" other cases because they regarded criminal contempt. This case is a criminal 
contempt case. I.C.R. 42(a)(7). 
"
0 ,Juvenile Magistrate Manweiler revealed this opinion of Magistrate Watkins after adjudicating Defendant 
guilty of contempt. No evidence, at trial or at sentencing, supported this opinion. The opinion related 
directly to the issues involved in the contempt case (fairness, courtesy, and civility). At the district court, 
Defendant contended that he was denied his right to an impartial adjudicator pursuant t0Cape1ton u. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S.Ct. 2252, 2262 (2009). Judge Sticklen did not apply the Caperton due process 
standard, but instead applied an earlier Idaho case. Due only to space limitations, Defendant has not 
included this argument on appeal. 
"
1 The only conceivable distinction is that the case at bar involves a motion rather than a media statement. 
But if the concern is the judge's reputation, that distinction cuts the other way, as a media statement is 
much more likely to affect the judge's reputation. Regardless, as explained below, in-court statements 
premised on concern for judicial reputation are subject to the ban on contempts so premised. In re Little, 
404 U.S. 553 (1972). 
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d. Officers of the Court. Judge Sticklen stated that "there is simply no 
condoning such a practice by an attorney, who is, of course, considered an officer of the 
court." R. 477. First of all, the First Amendment does not protect only the language of which 
Judge Sticklen condones.22 Next, she cited a case that justified sanctions on the basis that 
"such language promotes disrespect for the law and for the judicial system. Officers of the 
court are obligated to uphold the dignity of the Court of Justice and, at a minimum, this 
requires them to refrain from the type of conduct at issue here." R. 478. This argument 
contains two "justifications" for criminalizing the relevant criticism: concern for the "dignity" 
of the court, and an attorney's status as an "officer of the court." 
However, "concernfor the dignity . .. of the courts does not justify the 
punishment as criminal contempt of criticism of the judge or his decision." 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272-73 (citing Bridges, supra). The Court emphasized that criminal 
contempt cannot be used to punish judicially critical speech, even if "the utterance contains 
'half-truths' and 'misinformation."' Id. at 273 ( quoting Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 
342,343 n. s, 345 (1946)). For indirect contempts, concern for the court's "dignity" does not 
suffice. The Supreme Court is unambiguous in this regard. 
Although the Court's language is clear enough, the lower courts distinguished 
applicable U.S. Supreme Court precedents, discussed infra, on the basis that Defendant is an 
attorney. In cases of attorney discipline, this distinction has gained significant traction.23 But 
as explained above, in the criminal context, it is entirely meritless. The simple fact is that the 
governing criminal contempt cases were based on the public outrage that resulted from 
"" Defendant does not "'condone" burning the American flag or lying about receiving a Purple Heart, but the 
First Amendment protects those forms of expression. 
"
1 Though not without critics. Margaret Tarkington, The Tmth Be Damned: The First Amendment, Attorney 
Speech, cmdJudicialReputation, 97 GEO. L. J. 1567 (2009). 
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punishment of an attorney's judicially critical speech. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 266-67. 
Specifically, the root justification for the First Amendment criminal contempt cases is the 
infamous case involving attorney Luke Lawless and Federal Judge Peck. 
During a pending case, attorney Luke Lawless published a letter to a newspaper, 
criticizing Judge Peck's decision. Judge Peck held Mr. Lawless in contempt, and Mr. Lawless 
responded by successfully effecting the House's impeachment of Judge Peck. Judge Peck 
avoided removal by one vote, and Congress immediately responded by enacting 4 Stat. 487 
(1831), which limited federal courts' contempt powers. Bridges 314 U.S. at 267. With this 
backdrop, the U.S. Supreme Court formulated the standard that, to punish for contempt, "the 
substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high[. 
T]he First Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits any law 'abridging the freedom 
of speech ... .' It must be taken as a command of the broadest scope that ... a liberty-loving 
society will allow." Id. at 263. 
Therefore, attorney speech is the origin of the cited First Amendment contempt cases. 
In criminal contempt cases, then, it is unreasonable to draw a distinction on the basis that the 
speech was an attorney's. Moreover, doing so would favor one group of speakers over 
another. Thus, it is likewise unpersuasive that an attorney is often considered an "officer of 
the court." Again in the context of contempt, the U.S. Supreme Court has spoken. Cammer 
v. United States, 350 US 399, 405 (1956). The Court, in concluding that attorneys are not 
subject to the federal contempt statute applicable to "Misbehavior of any of [the court's] 
officers in their official transactions," explained: 
It has been stated many times that lawyers are 'officers of the court.' [H]owever, ... 
an attorney [isl not an 'officer' within the ordinary meaning of that term. 
[N]othing ... places attorneys in the same category as marshals, bailiffs, 
court clerks or judges. Unlike these officials a lawyer is engaged in a private 
profession[. H]e makes his own decisions, follows his own best judgment, collects his 
own fees and runs his own business. The word 'officer' as it has always been 
25 
Id. 
applied to lawyers conveys quite a different meaning from the word 'officer' 
as applied to people serving as officers within the conventional meaning of 
that term." 
Regardless, judges clearly are officers of the court, and their comments clearly carry 
much greater weight than Defendant's. Yet, Justice Scalia, possibly the greatest legal mind in 
the last century, has aggressively attacked the personal integrity of his fellow Justices. See, 
e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,338 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Seldom has an 
opinion of this Court rested so obviously upon nothing but the personal views of 
its members."); Arizona v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2521 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(majority's opinion "boggles the mind"); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 592 (2003) (Scalia, 
J. dissenting) ("the Court has ... exposed Casey's extraordinary deference to precedent for 
the result-oriented expedient that it is."). It is likely that Justice Scalia, and even his 
fellow colleagues, would maintain that this sort of speech should never be suppressed because 
(1) it is core political speech, and (2) the harshness brings the truth to light.24 
Justice Scalia obviously does not stand alone as a participant in this sort of judicial 
cannibalism; he is merely the most prominent. And it supports Defendant's position, of 
course, that Justice Scalia is a true judicial officer. Justice Scalia is more likely to affect both 
the proceedings and the Justices' reputations. Moreover, it would hardly inspire faith in the 
,; See, Law Blog Chats With Scalia, Part II: 'Master of the Dissent' 
http:/ /biogs. wsj. com /law/ 2 008 / 05/ 3 o /law-blog-cha ts-with-sea lia-part-ii-m aster-of-the-dissent/: 
Do you view the judicial dissent as a form of advoca<.-y? 
Yeah, in a way. l'm advocating for the future. Who do you think I'm writing my dissents for? I'm 
writing for the next generation and for law students. You know, read this and see if you want to go 
down that road. We'd be better off on all sorts of issues - on legislative history, on originalism. But 
I'm not going to persuade my colleagut:!s and I'm not going to persuade most of the federal bench. 
'l'hey've had this so-called living Constitution stuff, you know,from the time they were in 
law school. 'That's not going to change. But maybe ·the next generation will see the 
n<lvantages of going back to the way we used to clothings. 
,Judge Sticklen argued that speech suppression is warranted out of concern for the dangerous possibility that 
the public will hold a negative view of the law. To that, Justice Scalia clearly would say," Exactly." 
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judiciary to criminally punish attorneys for such speech, but let judges off the hook 
completely. Attorneys, of course, do not work for the judiciary. They must challenge judges. 
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that "An independent judiciary and a vigorous, 
independent bar are both indispensable parts of our system of justice." In re lvlcConnell, 370 
U.S. 230, 236 (1962). 
e. The Dangerous Idea. The lower courts' expressed concerns are all 
"justified" by the notion that the dangerous idea must be suppressed. But, "the First 
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of 
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content[.]" Bolger v. Youngs Drug 
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983). The specific "dangerous idea" is that a member of the 
Idaho judiciary is unfair or unfit. Judge Sticklen explained that the idea must be suppressed 
" 
in order to prevent the danger of diminishment of the public's opinion of the system. R. 
477-78 ("there is simply no condoning such a practice[;] such language promotes disrespect 
for the law and for the judicial system.") Therefore, according to Judge Sticklen, the danger 
from the relevant idea, i.e., "the message it conveys," is that people may possess "disrespect for 
the law and for the judicial system." 
However, the Constitution does not permit punishment of the message sent by a 
"dangerous" idea. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected Judge Sticklen's specific 
contention. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 270 ("The substantive evil here sought to be averted [is] 
disrespect for the judiciary[.]") The Court reasoned that "[t]he assumption that respect for the 
judiciary can be won by shielding judges from published criticism wrongly appraises ... 
American public opinion. [A]n enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name 
of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably engender resentment, 
suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance respect." Id. The Court 
27 
plainly rejected as un-Arnerican Judge Sticklen's argument that speech should be suppressed 
because it may diminish the people's respect for the judicial system. Her theory, moreover, is 
wholly unsupported by the evidence. But it is false in any event: if Defendant's words were 
capable of inspiring the citizenry's widespread visceral contempt for the law, as Judge Sticklen 
so fears, then Justice Scalia's words would have resulted in universal American anarchy, or at 
least regime change, decades ago. 
f. "Insulting'' Seditious Libel. The lower courts clearly believed that the 
relevant speech was very discourteous, even "outrageous." But again, that does not justify 
jailing a judge's critic. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) 
("outrageousness" standard rejected for speech offensive to a public figure, because it is too 
subjective and "speech does not lose its protected character simply because it may embarrass 
others or coerce them into action."); Street v. New York, 394 US 576, 592 (1969) ("It is firmly 
settled that ... expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are 
themselves offensive to some of their hearers.") 
Judge Sticklen found the language "insulting." R. 485. Again, that is not sufficient. 
Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75 (speech regarding public officials "may well include vehement, 
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.") "The 
[U.S.] Supreme Court has never held that pure speech is unprotected by the Constitution 
when the speaker intends to vex, annoy, or hurt the feelings of another. It has held the 
opposite." State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885, 898 (2004). The Poe Court also noted that the 
Supreme Court "held unconstitutional on its face a state statute that criminalized words ... 
constituting 'harsh insulting language."' Id. ( citing Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 92 S.Ct. 
1103, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972)). The Poe Court further explained: 
[A] statute proscribing words "conveying or intended to convey disgrace" is not 
limited to "fighting words,"; a statute providing "No person shall abuse 
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another by using menacing, insulting, slanderous, or profane language" is 
not limited to "fighting words,"; a statute proscribing "harsh insulting 
language" is not limited to "fighting words,"; and a statute proscribing speech 
that "stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought about a condition of 
unrest" is not limited to "fighting words,"[;] limiting Idaho Code§ 18-6409 to words 
spoken with the intent to "vex, annoy, or injure another person's feelings" is 
not limited to "fighting words." 
Id. at 899 (citations, alterations omitted). 
"Fighting words" is the only category of unprotected speech that conceivably could 
encompass "insulting" language. However, it is clear that any proscription of "insulting" 
language would be overbroad and thus unconstitutional. Thus, the proscription is overbroad 
and unenforceable. Regardless, it is equally clear that the specific speech does not constitute 
"fighting words." Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409 ("fighting words ... are likely to provoke the 
average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace.") (quotations omitted). 
In America, public officials in particular must endure hurtful language. "The 
public-official rule protects the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the 
people concerning public officials, their servants." Garrison, 379 U.S. at 77. Therefore, 
"anything which might touch on an official's fitness for office is relevant. Few personal 
attributes are more germane to fitness for office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper 
motivation, even though these characteristics may also affect the official's private 
character." Id. 
Public officials derive their power from the People; they are the People's servants and 
are naturally subjected to harsh criticism of their official actions. "[T]he censorial power 
is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over the people. 
It would give public servants an unjustified preference over the public they serve, 
if critics of official conduct did not have a fair equivalent of the immunity granted 
to the officials themselves." Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 282-83. It is completely backwards, 
29 
then, to suggest that a judge may employ contempt powers to punish speech that criticizes his 
official conduct. A judge would be immune from such statements, but no citizen possesses the 
ability to respond similarly to a judge's speech. The censorial power is supposed to be in the 
People over the Government. The instant charges exalt the Government's censorial power 
over the People's. The "doctrine that the governed must not criticize their governors [is] 
obsolete[.]" Id. at 272 (quotes omitted). 
These basic American principles explain the rejection of the very basis of the charge 
against Defendant: Seditious Libel. The Sedition Act of 1798 made it criminal to "publish [a] 
false, scandalous and malicious writing ... against the government ... , with intent to ... 
bring [it] into [the] contempt [of] the good people of the United States." Id. at 273-74. This 
proscription bears a startling resemblance to the allegations in the Written Charge. R. 7 
(these statements "serve no purpose other than to degrade the court and bring it into the 
contempt of the people."). The Written Charge is, unequivocally, an accusation of Seditious 
Libel; therefore, in this case, the lower Idaho courts have upheld Seditious Libel as a basis to 
punish speech. However, the unconstitutionality of Seditious Libel has been broadly 
recognized, id. at 276, and therefore cannot justify employment of contempt powers. But as of 
now, Idaho condones the punishment of Seditious Libel. 
g. Utterances In the Courtroom Itself, During a Judicial Proceeding. 
The Gentile Court, in dicta,25 stated that an attorney's speech is extremely circumscribed when 
it occurs "in the courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding." 501 U.S. at 1071. 
Undoubtedly, the interest referenced by the Court's dicta was order in the courtroom. That 
justification explains the drastic due process differences between indirect and direct contempts. 
'
0 The speech in Gentile did not occur "in the courtroom itself," nor was it "during a judicial proceeding." 
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The latter often are punished with almost no process,26 i.e., summarily, if the conduct 
occurred in open court and disturbed its business. !.C.R. 42(a)(4), (b)(l)-a. - c. Here, 
though, the interest of preserving order in the court is inapplicable because the speech was not 
"in the courtroom itself' or "during a judicial proceeding." 
Nevertheless, even in open court contempt cases, the U.S. Supreme Court distinguishes 
between conduct offensive to a judge's sensibilities and statements that could disrupt the 
judicial proceedings. If the concern is merely a judge's sensibilities or reputation, then the 
concern is Constitutionally invalid. If the concern regards maintaining order in the 
courtroom, then contempt powers may be employed. In re Little, 404 U.S. at 555 ("There is 
no indication ... that petitioner's statements were uttered in a boisterous tone or 
in any wise actually disrupted the court proceeding. Therefore, [the expression] must 
constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice .... Judges 
are supposed to be men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate. Trial courts must be 
on guard against confusing offenses to their sensibilities with obstruction to the 
administration of justice.") (quotations, citations, alterations omitted). 
h. This is a Matter for the Idaho State Bar. After one considers the above 
rationales for limiting Defendant's speech, it is clear that none applies to Defendant. 
Contempt exists to protect the proceedings, not judges. The "law of contempt is not made for 
the protection of judges[.]" Craig, 331 U.S. at 376. Yet, the concern at trial clearly was the 
magistrate's reputation, and on intermediate appeal the concern appeared to be 
professionalism. If the concern is reputation, it is not a basis for contempt. If it is 
professionalism, then the matter is for the Idaho State Bar and the Idaho Supreme Court. 
To be sure, magistrates and judges possess the power to control the conduct of parties 
"'Though not entirely without process. Taylorv. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974). 
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and attorneys, insofar as their conduct adversely affects the proceedings. But if the conduct 
does not affect the proceedings, and merely affects the magistrate's sensibilities or reputation, 
the proper response is to lodge a complaint with the Idaho State Bar. Not everything 
offensive to the judiciary is criminal. It is not appropriate - all in the name of preserving 
judicial integrity - to erroneously charge someone with criminal conduct simply because the 
judiciary finds the conduct unprofessional. Defendant never argued the language was 
professional (he did not even fight the Idaho Bar's charges). It just wasn't criminal. 
4. The Actual Malice Standard, Including the Defense of Truth, Applies 
This subsection explains the mens rea that the state was required to prove. The 
Written Charge alleged that "these statements concerning the qualifications or integrity of the 
court are libelous[.]" R. 6-7. As explained above, it did not identify the mens rea element of 
the offense. Garrison identifies this element. Garrison holds that actual malice must be 
proved in order to inflict criminal punishment on an attorney for his judicially critical speech. 
"Actual malice" means that "only those false statements made with the high degree of 
awareness of their probable falsity ... may be the subject of ... criminal sanctions." 
Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74-75. The defendant must have "in fact entertained serious 
doubts as to the truth of his publication." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 
(1968). Therefore, the test is a subjective test. 
,Judge Sticklen erred when she implied that truth was not a defense (see, R. 477-79). 
Garrison, 379 U.S. at 78 ("the New York Times rule, [actual malice,] absolutely 
prohibits punishment of truthful criticism"). In fact, truth is a defense, even if the 
statement was "caustic," "unpleasantly sharp," or "spoke[n] out of hatred." Id. at 73-75. 
Statements cannot be punished if they are incapable of being proved true or false. Standing 
Committee on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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From the above principles, it follows that if the relevant statements were not made 
with "actual malice," then even the combination of factual error and defamatory content does 
not suffice. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 273 ("If neither factual error nor defamatory content 
suffices to remove the constitutional shield from criticism of official conduct, the combination 
of the two elements is no less inadequate.") It is also not sufficient if the official's reputation is 
actually damaged. Id. 
5. U.S. Supreme Court Criminal Contempt Case Law 
This subsection explains the actus reus that the state was required to prove. As 
explained above, the U.S. Supreme Court is explicit that concern for reputation does not 
suffice. "For such injuries, when the statements amount to defamation, ajudge 
has such remedy in damagesfor libel as do other public servants." Pennekamp, 
328 U.S. at 348-49. Pennekamp involved facts that would have warranted a defamation suit, 
even under the Sullivan standard.27 Criminal contempt was unwarranted, however, because 
defamation of the court does not constitute contempt of the court. As explained, the law of 
contempt is not made for the protection of judges. Therefore, although it is necessary, it is not 
sufficient simply to prove actual malice. 
In addition to "actual malice," an imminent threat to the administration of justice 
must exist for a judge to employ criminal contempt powers to punish speech. Craig, 331 U.S. 
at 373 (the "history of ... contempt and the unequivocal command of the First Amendment 
serve as constant reminders that freedom of speech ... should not be impaired through the 
exercise of that power, unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question are a 
serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice.") "The essence of 
27 "[W]e have assumed [that] petitioners deliberately distorted the facts to abase and destroy the 
efficiency of the court[.] The Florida courts see in this objectionable language an open effort to use purposely 
the power of the press to destroy without reason the reputation of judges and the competence of courts." Id. 
at 349. 
;33 
'contempt' requires conduct that obstructs or tends to obstruct the proper administration of 
justice" and "courts must be on guard against confusing offenses to their sensibilities with 
obstruction to the administration of justice." Ex Parte Gibson, 811 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tx. Cr. 
App. 1991) (en bane). "At common law, the criminal contempt power was confined to 
sanctions for conduct that interfered with the orderly administration of judicial proceedings." 
Dixon, 509 U.S. at 694 (1993). 
An imminent threat to the administration of justice must involve a 
"substantive evil [that is] extremely serious and [a] degree of imminence [that l.-.J 
extremely high." Bridges, 314 U.S. at 263. Further, "[t]he fires which [the expression] 
kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely likely, threat to the administration of justice. 
The danger must not be remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil." Craig, 
331 U.S. at 376. A criminal contempt conviction cannot stand unless the contemnor 
possessed the specific intent to impede the administration of justice. Wood v. Georgia, 370 
U.S. 375, 389-90 (1962) ("in the absence of some ... showing of a substantive evil actually 
designed to impede the course of justice in justification of the exercise of the contempt power 
to silence the petitioner, his utterances are entitled to be protected.") There is insufficient 
immediacy to justify contempt when the concern is that the speech may affect the judge's 
intellectual processes because "too many fine-drawn assumptions against the independence of 
judicial action must be made to call such a possibility a clear and present danger to justice. For 
this to follow, there must be a judge ofless than ordinary fortitude." Pennekamp, 328 U.S. at 
349. 
The above elements have been required by the U.S. Supreme Court with regard to 
direct contempt, In re Little, supra, indirect contempt, Bridges, supra, summary proceedings, 
In re Little, nonsummary proceedings, Wood, supra, and true officers of the court, id. 
:34 
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(sheriff)28• They apply here. 
6. Defendant Caused No Imminent Threat to the Administration of Justice 
A trial court may impose a criminal contempt sanction only if "the application of its 
discretion yields its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Rice, 145 Idaho 
554,556 (2008) (citing Gilbert, 144 Idaho at 246 ("To impose a sanction in a case involving 
criminal contempt, the trial court must find all of the elements of contempt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.")) The U.S. Supreme Court held that if the "imminent threat" requirement 
is not met, the statement will "not constitute criminal contempt." In re Little, 404 U.S. at 
554. It is an essential element of criminal contempt involving speech. Therefore, this Court 
must independently review whether the evidence was sufficient to prove this element beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
The evidence proves that the administration of justice was unthreatened: Magistrate 
Watkins testified that State v. Lorimor was proceeding as scheduled, tr. p. 29, 11. 18-20, that 
his rulings would not be affected, tr. p. 29, 11. 21-25, and that the matter was merely being 
treated as "joke" at the courthouse. Tr. p. 20, 11. 19-20. Thus, there was no real threat to the 
administration of justice, and certainly nothing imminently threatened justice's 
administration. As the Smith Court held, the "First Amendment requires that the threat to the 
court's authority must be real; the lawyer's statements and attendant conduct actually must 
have interfered with or posed an imminent threat of interfering with the administration of 
justice." 313 S.W.3d. at 136-37. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the lawyer's conviction 
because "the state stipulated that ... ,Judge Carter did not rule differently, or fail to take any 
action ... based on actions of [the attorney.] If that is true, as the state agrees, was the threat 
'
8 "[A]ssuming that the Court of Appeals did consider to be significant the fact that petitioner was a sheriff, 
we do not believe this fact prov ides any basis for curtailing his right of free speech. There is no evidence that 
the publications interfered with the performance of his duties as sheriff or with his duties, if any he had, in 
connection with the grand jury's investigation. We are not dealing with a situation where a sheriff refuses 
to issue summonses or to maintain order in the court building[.J" 370 U.S. at 394. 
to the court's authority real?" Id. at 137; See also, Wood, 370 U.S. at 393 ("in the absence of 
any showing of an actual interference with the undertakings of the grand jury, this record 
lacks persuasion in illustrating the serious degree of harm to the administration oflaw 
necessary to justify ... the contempt power.") 
Likewise, in this case, the only evidence presented is that justice was administered 
exactly as it would have been administered if the motion had not been filed. Mr. Lorimor was 
exonerated at his trial. His trial was not delayed, and Magistrate Watkins' rnlings were no 
different. Defendant's conviction therefore cannot stand. Defendant's conviction also must be 
reversed because no evidence was presented to demonstrate that Defendant possessed the 
specific intent to impede the administration of justice. The motion, after all, involved 
anticipated withdrawal from the administration of justice. A judgment of acquittal must 
enter. 
7. Defendant did not Act with Actual Malice 
This Court must independently review whether the evidence is sufficient to prove, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the statements were false and that Defendant made the 
statements while knowing that they were false or with a high degree of awareness of their 
probable falsity. The evidence is not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Defendant acted with actual malice as to each statement allegedly made. Rather, the only 
evidence is directly to the contrary. The Written Charge contains four allegations: 
CHARGE: [t] That on August 12, 2011, Mr. Scott filed a Motion to Withdraw as 
attorney of record for Defendant Lorimor, [2] that the motion cited the following 
grounds for withdrawal: that this court was too lazy to listen to an exhibit before 
making its ruling; that the court was too incompetent to reach the correct legal 
conclusion; that the court made up facts to support its ruling; that this court made up 
this fact so that its former employer would benefit, and; that the court was prejudiced 
against Mr. Scott. [3] That these statements concerning the qualifications or integrity 
of the court are libelous and [4] serve no purpose other than to degrade the court and 
bring it into the contempt of the people. 
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With regard to allegation 2, the motion simply did not state that all of those "grounds" 
were true. Yet, the Written Charge used the conjunctive "and," and therefore alleged that the 
motion did assert the truth of all of those grounds. The motion actually stated a disjunction 
relating to the "belief' that the court was "either biased toward [Boise City], prejudiced against 
[Defendant], too lazy to actually listen to the recording of the relevant interview, or too 
incompetent to reach the correct conclusion from the facts." State ex. 1 p. 7. The motion's 
statement is clearly not the same as the statements alleged. Hence, it was not proved that the 
motion made the statement alleged. 
Even if the Written Charge had accurately stated the contents of the motion, the state 
would be required to disprove each disjunct in the disjunction contained within the motion. 
To disprove "(a), (b), (c), or (d)" one must disprove each disjunct, i.e., (a), (b), (c), and (d). 
For example, if (c) is true, then it is always the case that "(a), (b), (c), or (d)" is true, 
irrespective of the truth of (a), (b), or (d). Therefore, the state was required to prove, beyond 
' 
a reasonable doubt, that (1) the court was not prejudiced against Defendant, and that (2) 
Defendant actually knew that no prejudice existed or acted with a high degree of awareness 
that there was no prejudice. The state did not do so. 
There existed overwhelming evidence of Magistrate Watkins' prejudice against 
Defendant. Magistrate Watkins admitted that he acted "out of character" when he insulted 
Defendant (i.e., he treated Defendant differently), tr. p. 35, 11. 21-25, p. 36, 1. 1-3, and he 
admitted that he did not like the tone of Defendant's briefing because it was too "overbearing" 
and "pompous" tr. p. 34, 11. 13-25 "for someone making their (sic) first appearance in front of 
me." State Ex. 2, p. 11, 11. 9-10; see also, tr. p. 34, 11. 13-25 (reiterating at trial this rationale for 
insulting Defendant). Therefore, reasonable doubt clearly existed regarding whether 
Magistrate Watkins held a prejudice against Defendant, because Magistrate Watkins 
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repeatedly admitted that he treated Defendant differently. And he did so on a questionable 
basis - that Defendant had never appeared before him. Truth therefore is a defense. 
Moreover, given that Magistrate Watkins insulted Defendant prior to the Motion to 
Withdraw, it cannot be denied that Defendant acted without "actual malice" as to the 
prejudice disjunct. In other words, it is safe to infer that someone holds a prejudice against 
the person he insults. The motion itself stated that prejudice was mentioned as a "possibility" 
because "the Court impugned Counsel's ability to practice criminal law in Ada County." State 
Ex. 1, p. 7 n.2. The evidence, therefore, is clear that Defendant did not believe the statement 
was false. No actual malice existed regarding the disjunction, because Defendant clearly acted 
without actual malice as to the prejudice disjunct. 
Defendant also acted without actual malice as to the disjunct suggesting that the 
"correct conclusion from the facts" had not been competently reached. The basis for this 
statement was Defendant's belief that Lorimor never made the admission to drinking out of a 
flask at the Egyptian Theatre. The motion stated, "If this admission had been made, Counsel 
would not have presented the arguments he did.'' State Ex. 1, p. 4. Robert R. Chastain also 
stated that he caused Defendant "Absolutely" to believe the admission had not been made, 
eliminating the possibility that Defendant acted with "actual malice." The state never 
cross-examined Mr. Chastain or impeached his testimony in any way. Tr. p. 74, 11. 19-22. 
The uncontroverted evidence, therefore, is that Defendant acted without actual 
malice. Defendant acted not with a "high degree of awareness" of the statement's probable 
falsity, but instead of its truth. 
Regardless of Defendant's subjective beliefs, truth is a defense. Magistrate Watkins 
admitted that he did not reach the correct conclusion. At the Motion to Withdraw hearing, 
Magistrate Watkins stated that he reached his conclusion that Lorimor admitted to drinking 
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out of the flask, because the "admission" was "[n]ot one that was recorded [by Officer Nixon] 
but at a later time[.]" State's Ex. 2, p. 9, 11. 15-17. However, Officer Nixon testified several 
times to the effect that the "entire contact" was recorded, tr. p. 55, 11. 10-14, p. 58, 11. 2-4, and 
that his recorder would contain the "best time stamp" of the duration of the contact with 
Lorimor. Tr. p. 57, 11. 17-22. For this reason, Magistrate Watkins conceded at trial that it was 
"clear" that the "admission" was not made. The actual disjunction, had it been accurately 
alleged, therefore was proved true and Defendant's conviction cannot stand. At a minimum, 
reasonable doubt existed with regard to the truth of the statement. 
The same is true with regard to the motion's statement of a "made up fact," because 
"made-up" is defined as "fancifully conceived or falsely devised." www.merriam-webster.com 
(search "made-up"). The factual "finding" that Lorimor admitted to drinking out of a flask at 
the Egyptian Theatre was, as Magistrate Watkins admitted, "clearly" falsely devised. A 
judgment of acquittal must enter. 
Defendant also possessed ample reason to believe the fact did not exist, which also 
precludes the possibility that the statement was made with actual malice. Magistrate Watkins 
insulted Defendant because his motions reflected a supposed failure to understand the 
applicability of the consumption component of the relevant ordinance. R. 520. That insult 
could only make sense if the evidence supporting the applicability of the consumption 
component existed before the hearing on the motions, because the motions obviously came 
before the hearing. R. 512 However, Magistrate Watkins relied on statements at the hearing. 
State Ex. 2, p. 9, 11. 14-19. The insult did not make sense. As it is reasonable to expect a 
judge's insult to make sense, it was reasonable to expect that the evidence of the "admission" 
was presented before the hearing. The insult therefore supplied Defendant with a reasonable 
basis to believe the fact was not supported at the hearing. Actual malice was not proved. 
;39 
Next, if a nonexistent fact had been found, it was undeniably found "to the advantage" 
of the state, because the decision denying the motion was based on the admission. R. 520. 
The factual finding therefore was to the state's advantage. "To [Boise City's] advantage," of 
course, is distinct from "so that [Boise City].would benefit." A mistake can be made "to" 
someone else's advantage, but if an action is taken "so that" someone would benefit, it was 
done on purpose and therefore was not a mistake. The Written Charge again alleged 
something that was not stated and therefore is disproved by the motion itself. But regardless, 
there is no disputing the fact that Magistrate Watkins' "clearly" falsely devised conclusion was 
to the advantage of Boise City. 
Further, in order to prove the "exact charges," the state was at least required to prove 
every fact alleged. One such fact was that Magistrate Watkins did not competently arrive at 
"the correct legal conclusion." R. 6. The motion is clear that the relevant "legal conclusion" 
regarded Magistrate Watkins' application of the Miranda v. Arizona test for ascertaining 
whether a suspect was in custody. State Ex. 1, p. 7. An averment cannot be punished if it is 
incapable of being proved true or false, and whether a legal conclusion was "correct" is nearly 
impossible to prove true or false. 
However, if the issue of a "correct legal conclusion" can ever be deemed "true or false," 
there is simply no denying that Magistrate Watkins failed to reach the correct legal 
conclusion. The motion stated that Magistrate Watkins applied the relevant test as though it 
were a subjective test, and stated the test in internally contradictory terms. R. 521-22, state 
ex. 1, pp. 2-3. The actual test is an objective test. Stransbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 
(1994). Yet, the Written Charge alleged that the motion "libelous[ly ]" claimed that the 
correct legal conclusion was not competently drawn. In fact, the motion correctly stated that 
the legal conclusion was wrong. The state presented no evidence on this issue. It called no 
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legal expert to testify that the correct legal conclusion had been drawn. It therefore failed to 
prove this allegation within the Written Charge, and the conviction must be reversed. 
The state did not prove the "exact charges" against Defendant. The statements are 
true, and Magistrate Watkins admitted as much. Even if they were not true, they were 
undeniably free from actual malice. The conviction must be vacated, and an acquittal 
entered. 
D. The Evidence Was Not Sufficient Under I.R.C.P. 75 or I.C. § 7-601-1. 
1. Judge Sticklen Erred by Affirming based on a Different Authority than 
the Authority Under which Juvenile Magistrate Manweiler Convicted 
Defendant 
In the "Judgment of Conviction," Juvenile Magistrate Manweiler stated that 
Defendant was "Charged with the following offense[]: Contempt IRC (sic) 75." R. 158. 
Below, the state argued that Defendant "is clearly guilty of contempt under Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 75." R. 135. The state argued against Defendant's vagueness challenge on the 
basis that I.R.C.P. 75 "is set out so that anyone with ordinary intelligence could determine its 
meaning[.]" R. 128. This argument could only make sense if the state believed I.RC.P. 75 
were substantive, because the vagueness issues focused on whether Defendant had fair notice 
of proscribed conduct. R. 449-54. The state also argued that "Magistrates can punish for 
contemptuous acts, whether by rule, statute, or common law." R. 354. The state clearly 
pursued the charge with a procedural rule as its substantive basis. 
Likewise, Juvenile Magistrate Manweiler unmistakably distinguished between I.R.C.P. 
75, the common law, and statute: "judges are specifically granted [contempt] power under 
I.R.C.P. 75, the Idaho Code. and common law." R. 171. There is no question, then, that the 
,Judgment of Conviction's citation to I.R.C.P. 75 referred to a different contempt authority 
from statute or common law. I.R.C.P. 75 was the substantive basis. 
I.R.C.P. 75, however, is clearly not substantive. It is procedural. Yet, it formed the 
41 
basis for Defendant's conviction. In Smith v. Pace, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected the 
contention that a procedural rule could serve as a substantive basis for holding a defendant in 
contempt. 313 S.W.3d. at 130 n. 7 ("a rule, such as Rule 36.01(b), does not provide the right 
to seek a cause of action (for contempt], but merely the procedure[.]") 
The trial court's conclusion is similar to an argument repeatedly rejected by the Idaho 
Supreme Court: "As we have held numerous times, [I.A.R.] 41 provides the procedure for 
requesting attorney fees on appeal, but is not authority alone for awarding fees. Therefore, we 
cannot award attorney fees[.]" Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M. & Lynn Lea Family 
Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 219 (2008) (citation omitted). In other words, 1.A.R. 41 is not a 
substantive basis on which to request attorney fees; it merely provides the procedure to do so. 
Likewise, I.R.C.P. 75 is not a substantive basis on which to charge contempt; it is merely a 
procedure to do so. But given the state's and the trial court's arguments, there is no doubt 
that Defendant was "convicted" of I.R.C.P. 75. 
Judge Sticklen therefore erred in failing to declare the conviction void. See, State v. 
Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482,484 (2003) (an appellate court possesses the authority to vacate a 
conviction sua sponte "[ w ]here it is apparent from the record that the act the defendant was 
criminally convicted for is not a crime[.]") Defendant was convicted of a nonexistent crime, 
but the conviction was upheld on a different legal theory; therefore, on review, this Court 
should reverse. 1¥1cCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 268 n.8 (1991) ("the Court of 
Appeals affirmed [the] conviction on legal and factual theories never tried before the jury. 
[F]or that reason alone, ... the judgment must be reversed."). 
2. The Elements of I.C. § 7-601-1. were not Supported by the Facts 
Even if Judge Sticklen properly considered the applicability of Idaho Code§ 7-601-1., 
she should not have upheld the conviction because the facts did not support the elements. 
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That statute proscribes "Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge while 
holding the court, tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceedings." 
The state argued that this section did not apply. R. 354. Again, the Judgment of Conviction 
establishes that Juvenile Magistrate Manweiler agreed. 
Nevertheless, Judge Sticklen upheld Defendant's conviction under this section, holding 
that "the language in the statute concerning 'holding the court' and 'other judicial 
proceedings,' are (sic) sufficiently broad that the contemptuous conduct need not have 
occurred in a hearing or trial setting only, but could also occur in a non-hearing and non-trial 
setting, as occurred here." R. 482. However, the plain language of the statute contradicts her 
conclusion. Court was not held when the pleading allegedly was filed, and it did not interrupt 
the trial or other judicial proceedings: 
Q BY MR. NEAL [to Magistrate Watkins]: The behavior that you've identified as 
contempt, did it occur while you were holding court? 
A. It was not during the course of a legal proceeding. It was filed by your 
client. So it was not during the course of a -- a hearing. That it was while I was still 
the presiding magistrate over the case. 
Q. So did it interrupt the trial? 
A. It did not interrupt the trial. 
Q. Did-- did it interrupt any judicial proceedings? 
A. It caused a significant delay. 
Q. All right. Would you describe the delay[?] 
A. Because of what I read, I felt it was necessary to go forward with contempt 
proceedings which initiated all of this. So this is ongoing as opposed to the resolution 
of the criminal case. 
Q. Isn't it [State v. Lorimor] still set for trial October 20th[, 2011?] 
A. It is. 
Q. Isn't that the original date it was set for trial? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. So what's been delayed here? 
A. I'm just saying that the delay is that we are ... t,pending time on this 
[ contempt proceeding] rather than on the case itself. 
Q. I'm talking about State versus Lorimor. Has that been delayed? 
A. The -- it [State versus Lorimor] is proceeding as scheduled. 
Q. All right. 
Tr. p. 28, 11. 12-25, p. 29, ll. 1-20. 
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Court was not being held, and the motion interrupted nothing. The state presented no 
evidence that a proceeding was interrupted On this point, it is necessary to address 
Magistrate Watkins' testimony that Defendant created a "significant delay" by causing him "to 
go forward with contempt proceedings." Judge Sticklen never identified a single "proceeding" 
that was interrupted, but she did cite Magistrate Watkins' testimony regarding the "delay." R. 
482 n.19. Juvenile Magistrate Manweiler expressed the same conclusion in his Written 
Findings, finding the existence of a "disruption" because "Judge Watkins had to defer his 
judicial duties and obligations to testify at Scott's contempt trial and subsequent 
sentencing." R. 172. The courts cited to no other "disruption." 
Hence, remarkably, the contempt charge is premised on the fact that a contempt 
proceeding was held. That reasoning is not sound. First, the substance of Magistrate 
Watkins' testimony is relevant to whether there was an interruption of the course of the 
proceedings; the fact that he testified is irrelevant to that inquiry. Second, if these facts were 
necessary to prove an interruption, then it has been established that, at the time the charge 
was initiated, no interruption had been caused, and Defendant is therefore innocent of the 
charges against him. Third, these facts did not even exist at the time the charge was filed; 
therefore, reliance on such facts deprived Defendant of notice that they could be used against 
him. Fourth, as to Magistrate Watkins' presence at sentencing, the state and defense had 
rested by the time Magistrate Watkins made a statement. In fact, Defendant had already 
been adjudicated guilty. Tr. p. 97, 11. 19-20; p. 106, 11. 1-10. 
The lower courts clearly erred by considering such "evidence" to support the conclusion 
that Defendant caused an interruption of the course of the proceedings. Their reasoning is 
akin to claiming a defendant was guilty of obstruction of justice because he asserted his right 
to a jury trial. This rather repugnant conclusion cannot be reasonably defended. Because the 
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only purported "interruption" was Defendant's contempt trial itself, the uncontroverted 
evidence is that there existed no interruption of ajudicial proceeding.29 A judgment of 
acquittal therefore must enter. 
A judgment of acquittal also should enter because it is clear that Magistrate Watkins 
was not "holding the court" when the motion allegedly was filed. He admitted that the 
"contempt" "did not occur in my presence," let alone while he was "holding the court." In 
isolation, "holding the court" is unambiguous that a judicial proceeding must have been 
ongoing at the time of the alleged contempt. This conclusion becomes even more obvious 
when considering that the language immediately following "holding the court" relates 
specifically to proceedings.30 The conclusion is further supported by the fact that the statute 
contemplates interruption of the "proceedings." Proceedings must be ongoing to be 
interrupted. In context or in isolation, "holding the court" contemplates only live proceedings. 
To the extent "while holding the court" can be interpreted to include anything relating 
to the case, it is at least ambiguous, and the rule of lenity commands interpretation in 
Defendant's favor. "The rule of lenity states that criminal statutes must be strictly construed 
in favor of defendants." State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103 (2008). Either way, the 
conviction must be vacated. 
V. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS31 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 75(m) or I.C.R. 42(m), and I.A.R. 41, Defendant submits that he 
should have recovered fees below pursuant to LC. § 7-610, when he was represented by 
·~ There was also no evidence presented that the pleading "tended" to interrupt a proceeding. Regardless, 
,fudge Sticklen correctly interpreted this language to require only actual interruptions. R. 483-84. The 
··tending" language would be unconstitutional if otherwise interpreted. Wilson v. Moore, 193 F.Supp.2d 
1290, 1293 (2002). 
10 "Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge while holding the court, tending to 
interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceedings." 
11 Defendant is proceeding prose, and therefore is not able to recover attorney fees on appeal to this Court. 
Defendant reserves the right to request fees on appeal if he acquires counsel before this Court enters its 
decision. 
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counsel. The relevant conduct is clearly not criminal contempt, and the lower courts clearly 
acted without jurisdiction. For those reasons, the lower courts erred in refusing to award 
attorney fees under LC. § 7-610. Regardless, costs should be awarded as a matter of 
procedure. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should vacate the conviction as void; in the 
alternative, this Court should vacate the conviction and enter a judgment of acquittal. Either 
way, attorney fees and costs should be awarded. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
DATED: Mo.--/ (,pl 1-o l 3 
SIGNED: 
E~ 
I CERTIFY that on Mo...'f 0J 1 7.,, O l 3 , I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of this document on the Idaho Attorney General, by mailing, postage prepaid, 
the same to Idaho Attorney General, 700 vV. Jefferson St., Boise, ID 83720. 
DATED: 
SIGNED: 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
